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Phenomenology of phantomology: lessons from epilepsy. 
 
Peter Brugger, Zurich 
 
 
The term “Phantomology” was introduced by Polish science fiction writer Stanislaw Lem [1]. 
It designates the study of the virtual reality of the human body and is a visionary anticipation 
of modern virtual reality technologies. Used in the context of behavioral neurology, 
“phantomology” is the science of the body-in-the-brain [1], a body which manifests itself, on 
the phenomenological level, as phantom phenomena. Phantom phenomena are reported after 
amputation, in congenital absence of a limb [3], but also after deafferentation at all levels of 
the nervous system, i.e. after spinal cord injury [4] and in the course of subcortical and 
cortical lesions, where the propagation of somatosensory signals is interrupted at the central 
level, i.e. between primary sensory input areas and higher-order areas of the representation of 
the body as a whole. It is at this high level of disruption of bodily awareness that we can learn 
most from epileptic disorders. We present a selective review of the literature, with a special 
focus on phantom phenomena occurring with seizures. 
 
 
Supernumerary phantom limbs and epilepsy 
The awareness of an illusory “extra limb” is not infrequent after stroke, even if patients are 
sometimes reluctant to spontaneously report it [5]. Russel and Whitty [6] described three 
patients with a supernumerary phantom limb in traumatic epilepsy with parietal lesions. An 
illustrative case report of a man with new-onset attacks consisting in the experience of a left 
extra arm and leg was recently reported [7]. The supernumerary phantoms were the only 
manifestations of the seizures, whose origin could be tracked to the right parieto-temporal 
junction by ictal SPECT (EEG and MRI were nonlocalizing). The case report is also 
illustrative in a literal sense: it is accompanied by a drawing of the phantom percept sketched 
by the patient himself, a way of “picturing the invisible” to be preferred over artists’ drawings 
[8]. 
 
 
“Whole-body phantoms” and epilepsy: autoscopic phenomena 
The phenomenological classification of autoscopic phenomena [9] lists six major types: the 
“feeling of a presence”, the autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, negative and inner 
heautoscopy and the out-of-body experience. All these subtypes of an illusory reduplication 
of the bodily self have been reported as an epileptic manifestation. 
 
Feeling of a presence 
The “feeling of somebody being nearby” [10] is a classic ictal phenomenon. It is most similar 
to the phantom limb experience in that it lacks visual quality, yet, the localization of “the 
other” in space is as precise as that of a phantom limb. This “invisible doppelgänger” [11] is 
often confined to one side of the body, but even in cases with a strictly unilateral seizure focus, 
the phenomenon is not necessarily lateralized [12] or is experienced ipsilesionally [13]. For 
the experimental evocation of a “presence” by electrocortical stimulation see ref. [14].  
 
Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy 
An autoscopic hallucination is the experience of seeing an image of oneself while one’s 
observer’s perspective is unambiguously centered on the body. Heautoscopy refers to the 
encounter with a double of oneself, while typically, the patient is at a loss to decide where 
“the real me” is located. This taxonomic distinction may seem picky, but has recently 
received support by lesion-symptom mappings [15]. The major lesion site is the right 
extrastriate cortex in autoscopic hallucinations (in accordance with focus localization in early 
case reports; 16; 17), but the left posterior insula and parietal cortex in heautoscopy. Insular 
involvement may account for the highly complex psychological interactions between patients 
and their doubles, whether described in the belletristic accounts of famous writers with 
epilepsy (ref. 18 for overview) or as reflected in the comparably dramatic contents of seizure 
equivalents [19; 20]. In the epilepsy literature, the distinction between these two subtypes of 
autoscopic phenomena is rigorously followed by some authors (e.g., 21; 22), but 
unfortunately not by others [23]. 
 
Negative and inner heautoscopy 
Negative heautoscopy is the experience of not seeing one’s body when looked at directly (or 
in a mirror), despite otherwise preserved visual perception. In epilepsy, the phenomenon was 
labeled “asomatoscopy” [24] to emphasize its conceptual similarity to asomatognosia, which 
is a more frequent phenomenon experienced during seizures [25]. Inner heautoscopy means 
the visualization of one’s own internal organs in extracorporeal, peripersonal space. Phantom 
sensations do exist for internal organs [26], and inner heautoscopy may constitute a 
synesthesia-like visualization of coenesthetic sensations [27]. Modern descriptions are rare; 
perhaps due to mixing the phenomenon up with an entirely different phenomenon, i.e. “x-ray 
vision”, the demonstrably false claim to see other peoples’ inner organs [28].    
 
Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) 
Descriptions of OBEs have a long tradition in parapsychology [29], but scattered reports have 
always been around in the neuropsychiatric literature as well, especially in connection with 
seizure disorders [30; 31]. Neuroscientists’ and philosophers’ interest in phenomenon has 
exponentially increased [32; 33] after a seminal Nature paper in the year of 2002 [34]. This 
report described the experimental induction of an OBE by electrocortical stimulation over the 
parieto-temporal junction during presurgical epilepsy evaluation. Evoked-potential mappings 
during visual perception and perspective-taking tasks proved useful to pinpoint, in the healthy 
brain, critical stages of the experience and to delineate the mechanisms underlying various 
phenomenological details of an OBE [35]. In patients, methods to localize a seizure focus are 
similarly important to identify those neocortical structures involved in the mediation of single 
elements of one of the most complex phantom body experiences [36]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Seizure disorders provide a rich source of insight for the field of phantomology. The study of 
focal and complex-partial seizures reveals a broad phenomenology of altered perceptions of 
body and self, and seizure localization helps attributing certain symptoms to underlying 
neural circuits. In addition, since Wilder Penfield [37], experimental evocations of phantom 
phenomena in the frame of presurgical evaluations have repeatedly contributed to a better 
understanding of how the body is represented in the brain and how the self is hooked up with 
the body. Finally, the “psychiatric” components of phantom limbs and bodies are best 
reflected in the phenomenology of temporal-limbic seizures, and as “psychiatry is but 
neurology of the limbic system” (ref. 38, p.603), many apparently “purely” psychological 
complexities associated with autoscopic phenomena (e.g. ref. 39) may well turn out to be the 
expression of limbic hyperactivity. In brief, epilepsy research can formidably elucidate the 
varieties of extracorporeal experiences – from phantom limb to phantom body [40]. 
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